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REPLY POINTS AND AUTHORITIES
I.

CORRECTIONS TO WIFE'S STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND
FACTS
Wife incorrectly asserts in her statement of the case that the California court

assumed jurisdiction (after the Utah court below declined jurisdiction) based on a finding
that u[Husband] is a resident of California." However, the official transcript of the
I
proceedings in California shows that the court did not rel) upon this finding as basis for
assuming jurisdiction. (R: 484-487). Rather, the California court explicitly held it's
assumption of subject-matter jurisdiction was based on two other reasons. (R:486-488).
First, Husband made a "general appearance" by litigating jurisdiction without making a
special appearance. (R:488). Second, because Husband did not challenge Wife registering
the Utah support order in California for enforcement purposes. Id.
In TJ 8(a) of Wife's facts she notes that after the court below declined jurisdiction
the California court found that Husband was a "resident" of California. However, the face
of the order does not identify whether this referred to Husband's physical or legal
residence. Under California law a soldier stationed there may properly be considered a
"resident" of California, but this is distinct from a finding that the soldier's "residence" or
I
"domicile" is in California. Cf In re Marriage of Thornton, 185 Cal.Rptr. 388, 395 (Cal.
App. 5d 1982)("Clearly husband was a resident, through not a domiciliary, of California
during these proceedings."). Because the transcript of the California proceedings shows
that the court did not engage in a domicile analysis but instead merely looked at where
Husband was physically "living" under military orders, (R:485, 488), it is clear it only
-4Rely Brief of the Appellant

found that Husband was & physical - not legal - resident of California.
In *fl 9 of Wife's facts she fails to disclose that that the Utah court formally held it
lacked subject-matter jurisdiction on September 17, 2008 -prior to California's
September 30, 2008, proceeding. (R:225). The fact the written order (drafted by Wife)
from the September 17 hearing was not signed until October 1, 2008, is irrelevant
because, under Utah R. of Civ. P. § 101 (k), the recommendation of a court commissioner
made in open court "is the order of the court" unless later modified by the court.
In ^j 6 and 9 of Wife's facts she fails to disclose that the court later clarified the
findings she cites to make it clear that it was only referring to the parties' physical - not
legal- residence in California. (R:556, ^ 4, Hrg. Trans. August 26, 2009 8:10-9:16, R:
550). The court made it clear it had made no findings on the issue of where Husband's
legal residence was and would need to hold an evidentiary hearing on remand. (R: 556).
Wife also neglects to disclose that Husband controverted all these factual
allegations by sworn declaration to the extent they suggested his legal residence was in
California or that he ever invoked the jurisdiction of California's courts. (R:466-471). In
Newavs, Inc. v. McCausland, 950 P.2d 420, 422-423 (Utah 1997), the Utah Supreme
Court held that when jurisdiction is disputed and the court renders a decision based on
documentary evidence alone without the aid of an evidentiary hearing,1 the plaintiffs

1
When, as here, the trial court merely relies on documents and proffered testimony,
this court is "in as good a position to review the proffer as was the trial court, as no
assessment of witness credibility occurred below." Fullmer v. Fullmer, 761 P.2d 942, 945
(Utah App. 1988). Accordingly, this court reviews the evidence before the trial court de
novo and draws its own legal conclusions therefrom. See Id.
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facts must be accepted as true unless specifically controverted by affidavits or by
i

depositions, but any disputes in the documentary evidence are resolved in plaintiffs
favor. Id. If the court does not hold an evidentiary hearing, it cannot weigh the evidence.
Id. at 422.
Here, because (1) Wife failed to introduce any affidavits or depositions
controverting Husband's version of the facts, (2) the court did not conduct an evidentiary
hearing, and (3) Wife relies on findings the court made based on her motion to dismiss,
all of Husband's facts must be accepted as true under Newaysj
Regarding <|| 12 of Wife's facts, Wife fails to mention that Husband had already
objected to the trial court's prior award of attorney's fees and costs thereby giving the
trial court an opportunity to rule on the issue of fees and costs. (R: 318-322, 430-437).
II.

THE COURT BELOW EXCEEDED ITS DISCRETION AWARDING
ATTORNEYS FEES BASED ON A FLAWED INTERPRETATION OF
UTAH LAW.
Reaching the Merits: While California's subsequent order made in reliance on

incorrect judgment of the court below is invalid for the reasons discussed infra in this
brief, even momentarily assuming this court were to hold otherwise, this court still retains
the authority to review whether the court below awarded attorney's fees to Wife based on
a flawed interpretation of Utah law. If the court below misinterpreted the UIFSA then its
subsequent decision to award fees and costs to Wife was a per se abuse of discretion
because the court would have never declined jurisdiction in the first place and she would
i

not have been the prevailing party. Cf Searle v. Searle, 2001 UT App 367, f 13. 38 P.3d
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307 (This court can reach the merits of the underlying judgment from which relief is
sought to determine whether the trial court abused its discretion because a decision
premised on a flawed legal conclusion constitutes an abuse of discretion). Wife does not
dispute this point in her brief
Issue Preservation: While Wife does not deny that Husband informed the court
below that it was error to award her attorney's fees based on an erroneous interpretation
of the UIFSA and failing to find that Wife needed help paying her legal expenses, Wife
asserts that because Husband did not reraise these objections when she moved for
additional attorney's fees after the trial court denied Husband's objections to the ruling
declining jurisdiction and awarding Wife attorney's fees, he cannot now challenge the
court's January 15, 2009, decision to award additional attorney's fees.
Wife is mistaken because in order to preserve an issue for appeal an appellant need
only present the issue to the trial court in such a way that the court has an opportunity to
rule on that issue. Brookside Mobile Home Park, Ltd. v. Peebles, 2002 UT 48, ^ 14, 48
P.3d 968. This is done by (1) raising the issue in a timely fashion, (2) specifically raising
the issue, and (3) providing the trial court with supporting evidence and/or relevant legal
authority. Id. Once a party has raised an issue and the trial court has had an opportunity to
rule on that issue, the issue is preserved. Id; See also Normandeu v. Hanson Equip. Inc.,
2009 UT 44, ^} 24, 215 P.3d 152 (Issues raised in opposition to a pre-trial motion did not
have to be reraised at trial to preserve them for appeal). There is simply no need "to
reraise the same issue in order to preserve it for appeal." Normandeu, 2009 UT 44 at ^ 24.
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Therefore, because Husband timely objected to the trial Court's decision awarding
attorney's fees and costs premised on an erroneous legal conclusion and inadequate
findings of fact and the court had an opportunity to rule on thesje issues, Husband's
objection to all the trial court's awards of attorney's fees and costs is preserved.
The Court Below Found Mandatory Attorney's Fees Were Unjustified: Wife
argues she is entitled to a mandatory award of attorney's fees under the UIFSA as a
sanction against Husband because she prevailed on the jurisdictional dispute thereby
triggering a statutory presumption that Husband requested a hearing in this case for the
primary purpose of delay. See Utah Code Ann. § 78B-14-313(£). The official comments
to Section 313 of the UIFSA explain that this section is intended to:
"provid[e] a sanction to deal with a frivolous contest regarding compliance with
an interstate withholding order, registration of a support order, or comparable
delaying tactics regarding an appropriate enforcement remedy."
However, the fatal flaw with Wife's argument for a mandatory award of fees is
that the court below found nothing to indicate that Husband commenced this action for
the purpose of delay. Rather, the court found - and Wife did not dispute - that Husband
brought his suit in good-faith based on a genuine dispute over the application of the law
as opposed to a frivolous delaying tactic. (R: 323, ^ 1, Hrg. Transc. October 22, 2008,
8:10-11:22, R: 387). The court specifically held that it was not imposing attorney's fees
as a "punitive sanction" against Husband. (Hrg. Transc. October 22, 2008 11:9-22).
Therefore, Wife is not entitled to a mandatory award of attorney's fees under the UIFSA.
Discretionary Award is Erroneous Absent a Showing of Need: Wife does not
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deny that she failed to present any evidence showing she was in need of attorney's fees
nor that the court made no finding she was in need. Wife fails to offer any reason why a
discretionary award of fees should be upheld in light of these facts other than pointing out
that this court has never addressed what factors a court awarding discretionary fees under
the UIFSA must consider. But, because (1) this court has consistently held that a showing
of need by the spouse requesting attorney's fees is sine qua non to a discretionary award
of attorney's fees when establishing a child support order, Connell v. Connell, 2010 UT
App 139, \ 29,

P.3d

, and (2) there is nothing in the UIFSA suggesting a contrary

test should apply, there is no reason why this court should not extend this well-known test
to reviewing discretionary awards of attorney's fees under the UIFSA. To hold otherwise
would preclude meaningful appellate review and would encourage arbitrary and
capricious fee awards under the UIFSA. Therefore, the trial court's judgments of
attorney's fees and costs must be reversed.
III.

UNDER THE COMMON-LAW RULE, SOLDIERS REMAIN
DOMICILED IN THE STATE THEY JOINED THE MILITARY IN NOT WHERE THEY ARE FORTUITOUSLY STATIONED.
Wife's argues this court should reject the common-law rule that "[pjractically all

of the authorities are in agreement" on that "a person inducted into the military service
retains his domicile or residence in the state from which he entered the military service"
21 A.L.R.2d 1163 § 13 (collecting cases)(the "military residence rule"), because the
Federal Service-members Civil Relief Act ("SCRA"), 50 U.S.C. § 501-596, does not
identify where a soldier's residence for child support jurisdictional purposes is but does
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state that a soldier retains his home domicile for voting and taxpurposes. Invoking the
canon expressio unius est exclusio alterius, Mother suggests Congress' failure to specify
where a soldier's residence is for divorce jurisdictional purposes in the SCRA gives rise
to the negative interference that a soldier's domicile is wherever the military fortuitously
happens to station that soldier.
Before addressing the glaring flaws in Wife's argument it is first necessary to
discuss the unique rules of statutory construction applicable to (legislation affecting
military service-members. The Utah Supreme Court explained) in Fatt v. Utah Tax
Comm'n, that in interpreting the SCRA:
"[t]he Act is to be interpreted liberally and in favor of those in the armed services.
A court must read the Act with an eye friendly to those who dropped their affairs
to answer their country's call. The judiciary should resolve all reasonable doubts
under the Act in favor of military personnel and construe the Act in light of its
paternal policy and consistent with its broad spirit of gratitude. The underlying
purpose of servicemen's legislation has been to enlarge, not to restrict or cut
down the rights afforded those in the military service."
884 P.2d 1233, 1235 (Utah 1994)(internal citations an4 quotations omitted and
emphasis added); See also Id. at 1236 (The rules of statutory construction favor
members of the armed services).
The fatal flaw in Wife's argument is that she erroneously assumes - without
citation to any authority - that the SCRA is the spring from which the military residence
rule flows from (as opposed to independent state or commonnlaw grounds). To the
contrary, it has been well-documented by courts and legal scholars alike that the military
residence rule has been around for centuries and originated in the English common-law.
See Domicile of United States Soldiers Serving in Federal Territory, 27 Harv. L. Rev. 472
(1914)(c•//ing Dicey, Conflict of Laws, 2 ed., 144 and Ex parte Cunningham, 13 Q.B.D.
-10Rely Brief of the Appellant

418, 425); Stifel v. Hopkins, 477 F.2d 1116, 1121-23 (6th Cir. 1973).
In Dodge v. Evans, 716 P.2d 270, 274 (Utah 1985), our Supreme Court implicitly
adopted the military residence rule when it endorsed the Restatement (Second) of
Conflicts of Law § 17 as authoritative in Utah based on the *clong-standing common law
rule [that] a person cannot change his domicile solely as a result of involuntary
confinement." Comment d of § 17 of the Restatement specifically concurs in the military
residence rule. Tellingly, practically all states and legal authorities to consider the military
residence rule have adopted it in one form or another, See Wamsley v. Wamsley, 635
A.2d 1322, 1325 fn 1. (Md. 1994) (collecting cases), and Wife has failed to offer so much
as a single authority to the contrary.
Because Mother does not contend that the SCRA preempts this common-law rule,
it is irrelevant what protections the SCRA does and does not provide to service-members
in addition to the common-law military residence rule because Husband's argument is not
premised on the SCRA. Rather, Husband merely argues the SCRA is an illustrious
example and extension of the military residence rule.
However, even assuming arguendo this court held otherwise, the United States
Supreme Court has held that the exclusio alterius canon does not apply to every statutory
listing or grouping. Barnhart v. Peabody Coal Co., 537 U.S. 149, 168 (2003). Rather, "it
has force only when the items expressed are members of an 'associated group or series'
justifying the interference that items not mentioned were excluded by deliberate choice,
not inadvertence." Id. If the expressed and omitted items do not go hand in hand then the
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canon is simply inapplicable, id. at fn. 12.
Here, Wife offers no analysis how the right to retain one's residence for child
support jurisdictional purposes while in military service goes hand in hand with retaining
it for voting and tax purposes. Rather, there is a strong common law presumption that the
federal government should not become involved in family law (matters. See Moore v.
Sims, 442 U.S. 415, 435 (1979)("Family relations are a traditional area of state
concern."); Morrow v. Winslow, 94 F.3d 1386, 1387 (10th Cii[. 1996); DuBroffv.
DuBroff, 833 F.2d 557, 561 (5th Cir. 1987)("There is perhaps no state administrative
scheme in which federal court intrusions are less appropriate than domestic relations
law."). Consequently, the canon is simply inapplicable here and Wife's reliance on the
SCRA to overcome the common-law military residence rule is misplaced.
IV.

"RESIDENCE" IN THE UIFSA MEANS "LEGAL RESIDENCE."
Wife does not dispute that every appellate court to consider what "residence" in

the UIFSA means has explicitly or implicitly construed it as synonymous with legal
residence. Wife likewise does not deny that every appellate court to consider where a
military service-member "resides" under the UIFSA has followed the common-law rule
that soldiers presumptively reside in the state where they joined the military - not where
they happen to be physically stationed. Finally, Wife does not dispute that the Utah
Legislature has instructed this court to give consideration to the need to adopt uniform
interpretations of the UIFSA across state lines. See Utah Code Ann. § 78B-14-901.
Without offering any criticism of the legal analysis employed by appellate courts in
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Utah's sister-states to reach the unanimous conclusion that "residence" in the UIFSA
means legal residence, Wife contends these decisions should all be ignored because - as
is the case in almost every appeal - no single precedent completely mirrors all the facts of
this case. However, Wife's argument is far more damaging to her own position because
she has failed to direct this court's attention to any authority adopting a position contrary
to how California, Georgia, Alabama, Indiana, Missouri, Texas, and Minnesota appellate
courts have uniformly interpreted the UIFSA.
Although Wife attempts to collectively distinguish all the authorities cited by
Husband based on various factual distinctions listed on Pg. 22-23 of her brief, she offers
no analysis as to how any of these distinctions are relevant under the UIFSA. While it is
well established that this court will not consider claims that are inadequately briefed,
State v. Garner, 2002 UT App 234, ^ 8, ^ 12, 52 P.3d 467 (When a party fails to offer any
meaningful analysis regarding a claim, we decline to reach the merits), Husband will
nevertheless strive to address these claimed distinctions in turn.
First, Wife suggests this case is distinguishable because although Husband was
born, raised, and joined the military in Utah, the military has never subsequently deployed
him to Utah. But, Wife offers absolutely no analysis as to how this claim is relevant under
the UIFSA, case law, or military residence rule given the undisputed fact Husband is from
Utah and intends to return to his home here once released from military service.
Next, Wife contends both her and Husband were "residents" of California during

2

Wife does not specify where she means they were both physical or legal residents
-13Rely Brief of the Appellant

their marriage and Husband did not object to California handling their initial divorce.
However, Wife does not deny that (1) they were married in Utah, (2) that she was only in
California because she accompanied Husband on his military deployment there, and (3)
she was the petitioner who invoked California's jurisdiction seeking a divorce - Husband
was merely the respondent. Wife offers no analysis how Husband's physical presence and
accommodation to her desire for an immediate divorce is releVant under the UIFSA or
case law gi\en the undisputed fact he was only in California bbcause of military orders.
To the contrary, In re the Marriage of Tucker, 277 Cal.Rptr. 403, 408-409 (Cal. App. 4d
1991), the California Court of Appeal held that a soldier deployed to California who was
sued for a divorce by his wife (who accompanied him there) ^nd who consented to
California entering, inter alia, initial child support orders did hot acquire a California
residence. Because the wife failed to show her soldier husband intended to stay in
California after his release from military service, California Was not that soldier's
residence even though California had just issued him and his wife a divorce decree. Id. at
408. Consequently, this factual distinction is simply immaterial.
Wife next argues this case is distinguishable from Amezquita because it did not
involve the "relocation of the obligee and the parties' child from the issuing state." This
argument is wholly without merit because Amezquita did involve the relocation of the
obligee and child. 124 Cal.Rptr.2d 887, 888 (Cal.App. 3d 2002).

of California. Because the court below found there was a genuine issue of fact as to
Husband's legal residency, Husband presumes Wife is referring to physical residency.
-14Rely Brief of the Appellant

Finally, Wife emphasizes none of Utah's sister-states have considered "residence"
in the UIFSA when a child support obligor - rather than the obligee - seeks to modify a
support obligation in the state where the obligee and child have relocated to. Again, Wife
offers absolutely no analysis how this distinction is relevant under Section 613 or 205 of
the UIFSA or case law. Rather, the plain language of Section 613 of the UIFSA suggests
it makes no difference which parent commences the modification action so long their
residence is in the same state.
Wife then asserts that this court should disregard how its sister-states have
unanimously analyzed military residence under the UIFSA because Utah has never
adopted the cornmon-law military residence rule. However, what Wife fails to mention is
that Utah has never had an opportunity to consider the military service rule because this is
a case of first impression. Therefore, under Wife's logic it is just as accurate for Husband
to say that Utah, like all its sister-states, has never rejected the military residence rule
either.
Next, while Wife concedes that both "residence" and "resides" have been
interpreted differently throughout Utah law depending on the context the terms are
employed in, Wife incorrectly asserts that Utah has consistently interpreted "residence" in
family law contexts as requiring actual physical residence as opposed to mere domicile.
However, that is not an accurate statement of the law.
Divorce Proceedings: When called upon to construe the term "actual and bonafide resident" in Utah's divorce jurisdiction statute, Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-1(2), our
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Supreme Court held that "bona-fide residence" is "synonymou$ with domicile]." Munsee
v. Munsee, 363 P.2d 71, 72 (Utah 1961). However, because th^ statute imposed the
additional requirement that one be an ^actual resident" of Utah in addition to having a
Utah domicile, the court imposed a physical presence requirement. Id. 72-73.3
Based on this parsing of the statute, the fatal flaw in Wi|fe's argument that this
court should interpret "residence" in the UIFSA the same as hc^w the Supreme Court
interpreted "actual and bona-fide residence]" in Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-1(2) is the fact
that the UIFSA does not require "actual residence" (or words to that effect) - it just
requires mere "residence." Therefore, interpreting "residence" in the UIFSA as
synonymous with domicile is consistent with the Supreme Court's logic in Munsee.
Cohabitant Abuse Proceedings: Wife's continues to place great - albeit mistaken
- reliance on this court's decision in Keene v. Bonser, 2005 UT App 37, 107 P.3d 693,
that "residence" in the context of Utah's Cohabitant Abuse Act means actual physical
presence - not domicile. In doing so, Wife ignores all the waijning signs this court placed
throughout its opinion in Keene that the Utah Legislature had adopted a broader view of
cohabitation and residence in the cohabitant abuse context than "Utah case law has in
other contexts." Id. at ^ 8, ^ 14, and 1J 25.
While Wife is correct that the dictionary is an appropriate place to begin analyzing

3
Following Munsee the Utah Legislature amended Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-1(2) to
allow military service-members stationed in Utah to sue for a divorce here even though
they are "not legal residents of this state." By negative implication, if an out-of-state
soldier stationed in Utah is not a legal resident of Utah then a Utah soldier stationed
outside of Utah must presumptively remain a legal resident of Utah.
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the words of a statute, it is not the end of the analysis. For example, in West v. Thomson
Newspapers the Utah Supreme Court criticized this court's over-reliance on the dictionary
to interpret the meaning of an allegedly defamatory word, warning that:
"[although a dictionary may define and give some content to allegedly defamatory
words, it cannot be dispositive. ... The problem with the lexicographical approach
utilized by the court of appeals is that it ignores context. As Justice Holmes
explained, 'A word is not a crystal, transparent and unchanged, it is the skin of a
living thought and may vary greatly in color and content according to the
circumstances and the time in which it is used."'
872P.2d999, 1009 (Utah 1994).
The Supreme Court further lamented that:
"An additional problem with the court of appeals' approach is that it leads to
confusing and irreconcilable results. The meanings that dictionaries attribute to
particular words are far from universally consistent. In fact, most dictionaries including the one relied on by the majority below - lists multiple, sometimes
conflicting, definitions for a single word."
Id. at 1009 fn. 15.
This is especially true when, as here, the so-called "plain meaning" of the words
"residence" and "resides" varies depending on whether this court consults Websters or the
Merriam-Webster dictionary, and even then they list multiple, and sometimes conflicting,
potential definitions for "resides" and "residence." In such cases, context and the duty to
avoid absurd results will ultimately be this court's guiding star to find the proper meaning
of "residence" in the UIFSA. See Berneau v. Martino, 2009 UT 87, % 12, 223 P.3d 1128.
The Keene court justified its broad interpretation of "residence" in the context of
the Cohabitant Abuse Act because the Act is intended to give victims of domestic
violence the ability to invoke the jurisdiction of a Utah court wherever their attacker
might be found regardless of where their permanent residence might be. 2005 UT App 37
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at 1] 15. Conversely, the UIFSA takes a completely opposite approach and is premised on
the idea that only a single court should be allowed to exercise jurisdiction over a child
support matter at any given time. Utah Code Ann. § 78B-14-205. Therefore, Keene's
broad interpretation of "residence" should appropriately remain confined to the cohabitant
abuse context as intended by the Legislature.
Interstate Child Custody Proceedings: This court has interpreted "residence"
under the PKPA (also known as the Full Faith and Credit for Custody Determinations
Act), 28 U.S.C. § 1738A, as being where a parent "legally resided" (e.g. his domicile)
prior to the commencement of an action. Barton v. Barton, 2001 UT App 199, ^j 13, 29
P.3d 13.
Synthesis of "Residence" in Utah Family Law Statutes: In summary, the rule
that can be synthesized from reading Munsee, Keene, and Barton together is that the word
"residence," whether in noun and verb form, typically means l$gal residence in the family
law context unless (1) the statute explicitly requires actual residence (as in Munsee) or (2)
the context of the statute suggests the Legislature intended a broader interpretation (as in
Keene). Ultimately, the proper meaning of this elusive word will vary on the context in
which it is used and is not subject to a universal definition applicable to all situations.
Therefore, because the UIFSA uses "residence" by itself without requiring
"actual" residence, combined with the fact the context of UIFSA is premised on the idea
that each person has only one "residence," the term must mean legal residence. However,
even assuming this court disagreed, Wife's argument must still be rejected because she
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has completely failed reconcile her argument that this court should look solely to Utah
case law to interpret "residence" in the context of the UIFSA with the Legislature's
directive in Utah Code Ann. § 78B-14-901 that Utah courts must give consideration to the
need to interpret the UIFSA uniformly across state lines. After all, the whole purpose in
the enacting the UIFSA was to break away from the problem of individual states setting
their own unique - and inevitably conflicting - jurisdictional requirements for interstate
child support matters. Therefore, unless all fifty-states are interpreting the UIFSA
consistently it will fail its fundamental purpose of avoiding jurisdictional disputes. For
this reason, this court must reject Wife's suggestion to look solely at Utah law when
construing "residence" in the UIFSA.
For these reasons - along with the reasons in Husband's opening brief- this court
should hold that "residence," in the context of the UIFSA, means legal residence.
V.

BECAUSE HUSBAND JOINED THE MILITARY IN UTAH HE
PRESUMPTIVELY REMAINS DOMICILED IN UTAH.
Wife misleading relies on various "findings" by the court below stating that

Husband was a "resident" of California, and argues this court should therefore find
Husband's domicile to be in California. What Wife fails to mention is that the court
below later clarified these findings and said it was referring just to Husband's physical
residence - not his legal residence - and that there was a genuine issue of fact concerning
his domicile. (R:556, ^ 4, Hrg. Trans. August 26, 2009 8:10-9:16, R: 550).4 Furthermore,

4
Because the court below did not make findings on the question of Husband's legal
residency and he does not challenge the undisputed fact he is physically living in
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because the court below dismissed this case for lack of jurisdiction based on documentary
evidence and proffered testimony without holding an evidentiary hearing, this court is
required to accept Husband's version of the facts as true on appeal and resolve all
disputes in his favor. See Neways, 950 P.2d at 422-423; Fullmer, 761 P.2d at 945. To the
extent this court finds any conflict between Husband's facts and Wife's allegations or the
trial court's findings, this court must resolve the conflict in Husband's favor.
Next, Wife relies on Allen v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 583 P.2d 613, 614 (Utah
1978) for the proposition that ''domicile follows residency and the burden of proof is on
the person contending otherwise," and argues Husband is therefore domiciled in
California because he is physically stationed there, albeit under military orders. Wife's
argument is flawed because while Allen correctly states the general rule that domicile
follows physical residency, she ignores the Utah Supreme Court's subsequent decision in
Dodge v. Evans, 716 P.2d at 274, that, based on the common-law rule espoused by the
Restatement (Second) of Conflicts of Laws § 17, "[a] person does not acquire a
domicile] of choice by his presence in a place under physical or legal compulsion."
(emphasis added). Applying this rule to the context of a prison inmate who claimed he
was domiciled in Salt Lake County because he physically resided there and all his earthly
possessions were in Salt Lake, the Utah Supreme Court held he was not domiciled there
because he was only in Salt Lake under compulsion.
The Supreme Court cited comment a in § 17 of the Restatement to explain the

California, albeit under military orders, Husband is under no duty to marshal the evidence
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rationale for special situations that reverse the general presumption of Allen:
"Acquisition of a domicile] of choice requires some free exercise of the will on
the part of the person involved. An act done by him under physical compulsion or
because of criminal or comparable sanctions5 will be legally ineffective for this
purpose."
Comment b goes on to explain:
"A person does not acquire a domicile] of choice in a place to which he goes, and
in which he remains, under compulsion of the sort described in the rule of this
Section. The fact that he decides not to leave is immaterial ..."
Comment d of the Restatement then goes on to specifically apply this rationale to
military service-members and states:
"[a] soldier or sailor, if he is ordered to a station to which he must go and live in
quarters assigned to him, will probably not acquire a domicile] there though he
lives in the assigned quarters with his family.6 He must obey and cannot choose to
go elsewhere."
In other words, the Restatement, consistent with the common-law military
residence rule, establishes a rebuttable presumption that a soldier retains his legal
residence in the state he joined the military in unless that soldier:
"regard[s] the place where he lives as his home, [but] [s]uch an attitude on his part
may be difficult to establish in view of the nomadic character of military life and
to show that a non-existent finding is clearly erroneous.
5
In Husband's case, he would presumably face a court martial and criminal
sanctions under the Code of Military Justice if he were to disobey military deployment
orders and return to Utah without leave.
6
Many courts and commentators have criticized the Restatement's "on/off-base"
distinction as immaterial because a soldier can only live off-base with his commanding
officer's permission, and even then that officer still retains the power to unilaterally
revoke that permission or deploy the soldier elsewhere at any time. Thus, even a soldier
living off-base near his duty station lacks the freedom to choose where he wants to live.
See Stifel, 477 F.2d at 1122-1123 (citing Domicile as Affected by Compulsion, 13 U.Pitt.
L. Rev. 697, 700 (1952)).
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particularly if he intends, upon the termination of his service, to move to some
other place." Id.
Because a home-state domicile continues until it is superseded by a new domicile,
Restatement (Second) Conflict of Laws § 19, the burden of proof that a soldier has
abandoned his home-state domicile and acquired a new one must rest on the party
alleging such a change. Id. at comment c. Therefore, because Wife is the party alleging a
change in Husband's domicile, she bears the burden of proving that Husband has
abandoned his Utah domicile and that he is not in California because of military service.
Because (1) the court below did not make any findings of fact on the question of
where Husband legally resides and (2) Wife does not claim th^t Husband intends to
remain in California for any reason other than obedience to military orders (Appellee Br.
Pg. 28), the judgment of the court below must be reversed andjthis case remanded for
further fact finding to determine where Husband's domicile is. On remand, the trial court
should be instructed, consistent with the military service rule, to presume that Husband's
legal residence is in Utah with Wife having the burden of persuasion to show otherwise.
If Wife fails to rebut this presumption then the court below shall assume subject-matter
jurisdiction over this child support modification proceeding.
VI.

CALIFORNIA'S SEPTEMBER 30, 2008, RULING CARRIES NO
PRECLUSIVE EFFECT BECAUSE IT IS NEITHER "FINAL" NOR
VALID UNDER FEDERAL LAW.
California's subsequent order made in reliance on the erroneous decision of the

court below declining jurisdiction is not entitled to full faith ahd credit (and therefore
carries no preclusive effect) because, in addition to the reasons stated in Husband's
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opening brief, it (1) is not a "final" child support order, and (2) it is invalid because it is
inconsistent with the Federal Full-faith and Credit for Child Support Orders Act
("FFCCSOA"), 28 U.S.C. § 1738B, which preempts California law.
As the Utah Supreme Court explained in Estate of Jones, a sister-state's judgment
is not entitled to full-faith and credit unless it is both "valid" and "final." 858 P.2d 983,
985 (Utah 1993). In addition, a judgment issued by a court without subject-matter
jurisdiction is not entitled to full-faith and credit and is void. Id; See also Restatement
(Second) of Judgments § 81 (A judgment rendered in one state and relied upon as the
basis for a defense in another state may be avoided in the second state on the grounds
that, inter alia, the first state lacked jurisdiction).7
Child Support Orders Subject to Modification Are Not "Final": While
admittedly the subsequent California order is "final" in the sense that an appeal can be
taken from it, Cf. Utah Code Ann. § 78B-12-110, it is not "final" under the full-faith and
credit clause because it remains subject to modification under the laws of the state that
issued it. See White v. Bennett, 553 S.W.2d 845, 846-847 (Ky. App. \911)(citing Barber
v. Barber, 323 U.S. 77 (1944) and Halvev v. Halves 330 U.S. 610 (1947)); the
Restatement (Second) of Conflicts of Law § 109; See also 27C C.J.S. Divorce § 1286.
Section 109(1) of the Restatement of Conflicts explains that:
"[a] judgment rendered in one State of the United States need not be recognized or
enforced in a sister state insofar as the judgment remains subject to modification in
7
Wife claims - without any citation to authority - that a void judgment can only be
avoided if challenged in the issuing state. However, the Restatement, the FFCCSOA and
PKPA take a contrary position.
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the State of rendition either as to sums that have accrued and are unpaid or as to
o

sums that will accrue in the future."
Comment a explains that "[o]rders for the support of... a child are typical
judgments of this sort." Because California Family Code § 3651 plainly states that
California child support orders are subject to modification, Wife cannot rely upon the
full-faith and credit clause to demand recognition of California's ruling.
Likewise, Wife's reliance on the H.U.F., Paffel, and Fujllenwider decisions are all
distinguishable because, unlike child support orders, neither paternity determinations nor
monetary judgments are subject to modification and thus fall outside the scope of Section
109 of the Restatements finality exception. Furthermore, Wife's authorities are
distinguishable because none of these cases involved situations like this where that first
state delegated the question of jurisdiction to the second state.
California's Subsequent Order Is Void Under The FFCCSOA: Given the
obvious problems with child support orders not being covered by the full-faith and credit
clause, in 1994 Congress enacted the FFCCSOA, 28 U.S.C. § 1738B, which requires
states to recognize their sister-state's otherwise non-final child support orders so long as
that order was made "consistently" with the provisions of the FFCCSOA. 28 U.S.C. §
1738B(a)(l). For a modified child support order to be made "consistently" with the
FFCCSOA by a state that issued the initial child support order, that state must be the
"residence" of either the obligor, obligee, or the child of the parties. 28 U.S.C. §
8
But see Restatement (Second) of Conflicts § 109(2) (Although the constitution
does not require states to enforce modifiable judgments issued by their sister-states, the
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1738B(d).
Although the FFCCSOA, like the UIFSA, does not define the term "residence,"
California has construed this exact same language in the UIFSA as synonymous with
domicile. Amezquita, 124 Cal.Rptr.2d at 890. Likewise, In re the Marriage of Basileh the
Indiana Court of Appeals thoroughly analyzed the term "residence" in the FFCCSOA
and, after considering the legislative history and the statutory context of the Act, likewise
came to the conclusion it referred to legal residence. 890 N.E.2d 779 (Ind. App. 2008)
affd 912 N.E.2d 814, 817 fn. 1 (Ind. 2009). This court has also interpreted "residence" in
the FFCCSOA's child custody counterpart, the Full Faith and Credit for Custody
Determinations Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1738A, as synonymous with legal residence. Barton,
2001 UT App 199 at ^| 13. Therefore, this court should follow the same analysis used to
conclude "residence" in the UIFSA means legal residence to find that "residence" in the
FFCCSOA means domicile as well.
Because there is no dispute that Wife and parties' child do not have a California
"residence," the only way for California to issue a modified child support consistent with
the FFCCSOA would be to make a specific finding that Husband had a California
"residence." However, the judgment and transcript of the September 30, 2008, California
proceedings are devoid of this requisite finding of fact because the court did not find that
California was Husband's residence, nor did it base its decision to assume jurisdiction on
where Husband was domiciled. (R:484-488).

constitution does not prohibit them from doing so either).
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Rather, California specifically said it was basing its decjsion on the irrelevant fact
that Husband made a general appearance (thereby subjecting himself to the personal
jurisdiction of the court) and because he did not contest Mother registering the Utah
support order back in California. (R:486-488). However, neither of these facts provides
California with a basis for asserting jurisdiction consistent with the FFCCSOA.
Failure to Object to Registration of a Foreign Support Order Cannot Confer
Subject-Matter Jurisdiction: Nothing in the statutory schema of the UIFSA or
FFCCSOA allows a court to assume subject-matter jurisdiction because a parent registers
a support order in that state for enforcement purposes and the either parent does not
contest it. See Utah Code Ann. § 78B-14-610. Under the UIFSA, a party can register a
child support in any state they want regardless of where the obligor, obligee, or child is
located. See Utah Code Ann. § 78B-14-601 to 602. Even in Amezquita the California
Court of Appeal held the mother was entitled to register her foreign support order in
California for enforcement purposes even though her military ljiusband did not "reside"
there and thus California lacked jurisdiction to modify that order. 124 Cal.Rptr.2d at 891
{citing California Family Code § 4959).
Therefore, to the extent the California court assumed jurisdiction on this basis, its
order is null and void as a matter of federal law under the FFCCSOA.
California Cannot Assert Subject-Matter Jurisdiction Just Because It Has
Personal Jurisdiction: This court was confronted with a situation similar to the case at
bar in Curtis v. Curtis, 789 P.2d 717 (Utah App. 1990), when ^ Mississippi court issued a
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final custody order based on the erroneous belief it had subject-matter jurisdiction
consistent with the Full Faith and Credit for Child Custody Determinations Act (or
PKPA), 28 U.S.C. § 1738A, because the appealing parent made a "general appearance"
litigating the question of subject-matter jurisdiction in Mississippi. 789 P.2d at 718-720.
This court held it was error for Utah to recognize Mississippi's subsequent final order
because, as a matter of federal law, Mississippi could not use the personal jurisdiction
doctrine of a "general appearance" to acquire subject-matter jurisdiction. Id. at 725-726.
Because Mississippi's order was inconsistent with the Full Faith and Credit for Child
Custody Determinations Act, this court concluded Mississippi's final order was null and
void as a matter of federal law. Id. at 726.
Because here, as in Curtis, it is clear from the court transcript that California
assumed jurisdiction because it had personal jurisdiction without making a specific
finding that California was Husbands "residence" or domicile, it's judgment is
inconsistent with the FFCCSOA and therefore void as a matter of federal law.
California Made No Finding That Husband's "Residence" Was In California:
Recognizing these fatal deficiencies, Wife implicitly contends California complied with
the FFCCSOA by finding that Husband was a "resident" of California. However, the fatal
flaw with this argument is that, according to the California Court of Appeal, there is a
distinction between a service-member being a "resident" of California and having a
"residence" or "domicile" in California. Cf In re Marriage of Thornton, 185 Cal.Rptr.
388, 395 (Cal. App. 5d 1982)("Clearly [the military service-member] husband was a
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resident, through not a domiciliary, of California during these proceedings."). A military
service-member stationed in California may properly be considered a "resident" of
California although their "residence" is in their home-state. Unfortunately, the face of the
California court's September 30, 2008, order did not clarify whether it found that
Husband was physically living in California or whether he was actually domiciled there.
However, a inspection of the transcript of the California proceeding shows the court
merely looked at where Husband was "living" under military oraers. (R: 485-488).
Consequently, because the California court failed to make a finding of fact that California
was Husband's domicile, its judgment is patently inconsistent \fvith the FFCCSOA.
Therefore, as in Curtis, its judgment is void as a matter of federal law.
A California Appellate Court Could Not Correct This Error Because This
Controversy Is Moot Until This Court Reverses the Utah Court's Judgment:
Although Wife is correct that a dismissal for lack of jurisdiction is not "on the merits" and
does not give rise to claim preclusion, it still "constitute^] a binding determination on the
jurisdiction question which is not subject to collateral attack." Kasap v. Folger Nolan
Fleming & Douglas, Inc., 166 F.3d 1243, 1248 (D.C.Cir 1999); See also Restatement
(Second) of Conflicts of Law § 110 comment b. Consequently, there was clearly nothing
a California appellate court could do to remedy this catch-22 because this controversy
was moot in California. All Husband could do is wait to directly challenge the erroneous
decision of the court below in this court first. Given these special and unique
circumstances, this court must decline to recognize California's ruling,
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SAN DIEGO, CALIFORNIA 92101

1
1
2

MONDAY, MAY 27, 2008; San Diego, California
Department 43

Honorable Patti Ratekin, Commissioner

3

9:00 A.M. CALENDAR

4

-- 000 --

5

MR.

6

on item number five.

7
8

EDLUND:

THE COURT:

Your honor, we're ready to proceed

Ma'am, please state your name for

the record.

9

MS. LILLY:

Korilee lilly,

10

MR. LILLY:

ArR0N LILLY.

11

THE COURT:

THANK YOU.

12

MR. EDLUND:

13
14

This is A local self CASE, one

chilD INVOLVED, KAiTELyn, CURRENTLY age five.
We're here before the court on the notice of

15

motion that the county FILED at the custodial parent's

16

request seeking to modify the underlying order.

17

underlying order is AN original California order that was

18

registered at one time, I believe, in Utah.

19

The

And now the county Has REGlStered the San Diego

20

order anD filed a motion to modify,

we did have the

21

opportunity to meET AND CONFER with the parties upstairs.

22

and from the notes it appears that the respondent IS

23

challenglNG the jurisdiction of this court under

24

continuing exclusive jurisdiction, saying that this court

25

does not have the ability to modify A N underlying order

26

as the mother lives out of state and he's ONLY in

27

California for military purposes.

28

his state of resideNCE.

Indicates that Utah Is

2
1

T H E COURT:

O N E of the problem is, sir, that you

2

filed a response submitTING THIS to THE JURISDICTION of

3

the court,

4

not file any documents, you must COME I N A N D make a

5

special appearance.

6

jurisdiction of this court to deal with this order.

in order to object to jurisdiction you must

You have waived any contest for the

7

when was it registered?

8

MR. EDLUND:

9
10

IT WAS REGISTERED IN march OF 2008.

My notes A L S O indicate that he's contesting the
commissioner.

11

MR. LILLY:

Ma r AM, your honoC, I currently have

12

AN objection to the commissioner's recommendation, that

13

was in Utah.

14

that.

15

other courthouse across San Diego -- I'm not EXACTLY sure

16

of the address.

17

any pending motion in Utah, WE'RE basically giving them a

18

chance to decide on the case FlRst.

19

copy of W H A T ' S been filed with Utah to include judge

20

oxney's comments.

21

And we have yet to have a hearing date for

I was told by judge OXNEY in December 2003 AT the

I WAS told by judge OXNEY if there is

T H E COURT:

I ACTUALLY have a

I
ONE of the problem is they

22

registered this April, you have 25 days to object to

23

registration.

24

obJECtion to registration.

25

here.

26

response, W H I C H submits to the California jurisdiction.

27
28

As far as I can tell there was no
So THE ORDER WAS registered

Then they filed A motion to modify, you filed a

So, as to your objection FOR me hearing the
case, I'll note that objection and issue a findings and

3

1

recommendation.

2

MR

EDLUND:

I believe there ARE issues

3

regarding jurisdiction of modification for child support

4

and modification of custody and visitation.

5

THE COURT:

I'm ONLY dealing with --

6

MR. L U L Y '

I object, your honor

I'm not here

7

to argue, and nothing HAS BEEN annotated on any FORM that

8

we're here to discuss visitation anD custody.

9
10

THE COURT:

RIGHT, WE'RE NOT.

MS

we've had -- we were married and

LILLY:

11

have lived here the ENtire time

12

l tried to file for A divorce in Utah B U T we couldn't

13

BECAUSE we never lived there together,

14

THROUGH California.

15

finalized.

16

sign the papers to MAKE The divorce finalized.

17

we got divorced here.

we had to file

THE divorce was set up anD

we lowered the child support to get him to

California knew that I was moving to Utah, back

18

to my home SO THAT I COULD CONTINUE WITH MY education A N D

19

GET A N EDUCATION SO I COULD provide for our daughter.

20

The California courts Knew that I was going there, T H E

21

Utah judge -- arroN put FORTH THE thing to the Utah judge

22

requesting for A child support order, whatever.

23

judge in DecembeR, O N December 3rd, judge OXNEY said that

24

arRoN told them there was something pending I N Utah,

25

which there was not.

26
27
28

MR. LILLY:
object.

The

And JUDGE OXNEY SAID -I object your honor.

Your honor, I

There was A -THE COURT:

Sir, she's speaking right now.

4
1

MS. LILLY:

Thank you, your honor.

2

Judge OXNEY said IF EITHER ONE -- that was fine

3

if we went to Utah, B U T if either one of us wanted to

4

bring it before her again that she would make THE

5

Decision.

6

have A N attorney there.

7

something about the foreign registration and that's all

8

that he fi1ed .

9

we've then taken IT to the court in Utah.

THE COURT:

I

ArRoN filed A foreign order,

Let me try to shprt circuit this.

10

where do you live?

11

MS. LILLY:

12

lived there since June 13th,

13

THE COURT:

SIR, where do you live?

14

MR. LILLY:

I live in San Diego.

15

THE COURT:

I L I V E I N west Jbrdan Utah.

I'VE

she's trying to modify SO she has

16

to come to California where you live.

17

the order here.

18

appearance based upon the filing of your motion.

You f re here.

She's registered

YOU'VE made A general

19

well, FiRst of all, based on your failure to

20

object to the registration, which was served on April

21

8th.

22

your income and expense declaration on September 23rd,

23

YOUR

24

jurisdiction.

25

talking about child support.

26

custody, visitation, anything to do with the child.

27

merely talking about child support.

28

And second, by your filing OF your response and

failure to make a special appearance contesting
Therefore, we have jurisdiction.

MR. E D L U N D :

I'm ONLY

I'm not talking about
I'm

Your honor, my' notes indicate if

1

the court was GOING TO find that California had

2

jurisdiction to modify, THE notes say, send back upstairs

3

and they will run the guideline calculations.

4

THE COURT:

I can do that.

I don't need them to

5

go back upstairs, unless you want to go upstairs anD work

6

out A N agreement.

7

MR. LILLY:

I'd rather go back upstairs.

8

MS. LILLY:

You can do it.

9

MR. LILLY:

Your honor, is there any possibility

10

to request a continuance so this could be heard in Utah?

11

It's GOING TO GO IN FRONT OF THE DUDGE.

12
13

THE COURT:

NO, The JURISDICTION OVER child

support is here.

14

MS. LILLY:

Thank you, your honor.

15

THE COURT:

Did you want to go back upstairs and

16

TRY

TO

TALK

ABOUT

SOMETHING AND

work out SOME agreement?

17

MR. LILLY:

I'm willing to.

18

MS. LILLY:

I don't care either way.

19

THE COURT:

OKAY.

20
21

See you back in a few minutes.
MR. LILLY:

22
23
24
25
26
27
28

WE'LL SEND IT BACK UPSTAIRS.

Thank you.
(Brief recess)

MR. E D L U N D :

Terry Edlund A P P E A R I N G on behalf of

the County of San Diego.
THE COURT:

M A Y THE record reflect both parties

ARE present.
MR. EDLUND:

Your honor, this is a local seLF

case WITH one child involved, Kaitlyn, age five.

THERE

6
1

IS A N existing order I N PLACE AT a thousand dollars a

2

month child support.

3

payments.

4

motion that the C0UN r Y F I L E D A T T H E request of the

5

custodial parent.

6

2008.

7

Respondent is current in HIS

We're before the court pursuant to A NOTICE OF

T H E motion was filed on JULY 30th,

we WEre previously before the court THIS morning

8

where the court did r U i e that the court had jurisdiction

9

to modify the suppor: order considering the resideNCE of

10

both parties.

11

with the parties after the court made that ruling and we

12

were not AbLe to reach a stipulation with the partiesthe.

13

We had AN opportunity to meet and confer

The contention is the time share.

The custodial

14

parent is claiming a 10 percent TIME SHARE and the father

15

is claiming a 25 percent time share.

16

custodial parent mother's earnings, she has a new job

17

that's startlNG in March, march 31st, 2008.

18

paystubs anD year-to-date earnings from March 31, 2008

19

through September 26th, 2008 with the year-to-date of 13

20

-- excuse me $13,702.52 year-to-date|.

21

with regard to the

We have HER

I don't believe there is A disputE with the

22

year-to-date, what T H E DISPUTE IS that she's recently

23

received a raise and she's in the medical profession and

24

SHE HAS A L L kinds of different pay rates and it's the

25

father's issues that she is now makiNG more money AND he

26

wants to have that somehow applied over ALL OF THE

27

year-to-date.

28

MR. LILLY:

That's incorrect.

My ITEM OF

7
1

CONtention is DUST that it's a year-to-date beginning in

2

March and she just started this job and -just got a raise

3

and I was wondering if there was any way that the court

4

can do AN hourly computation, the year-to-date will be

5

low BECAUSE she did not START worklNG until WELL INTO the

6

THIRD month of the year.

7

T H E COURT:

if i use the year-to-date that

8

encompasses that period of time, There OBVIOUSLY is SOME

9

issue ABOUT THE FACT that the prior year-to-date is

10

calculated at that lower hourLY rate.

11
12

MR. EDLUND:

she also has A deduction of health

insurance of $72 a month,

13

THE COURT:

okay.

15

MS. LILLY:

$12.81.

16

T H E WITNESS:

14

rate?

17

the military.

18

nontaxable of $3,098.

19
20

THE COURT:

22

THE COURT:

I got $3,092 per month off THE

I do not your honor.
He did not have a paycheck stub,

THAT WAS THE PROBLEM.

24

MR. EDLUND:

25

THE

26

MR. EDLUND:

28

Father's income, he is in

PAYCHECK STUBS; do you know what they used?
MR. E D L U N D :

27

$12.81.

He has taxable earnings $3,443 per month.

21

23

what's her current hourly

COURT:

It was THE l.E.S. that he provided.
Thank you.
He ALSO has A health insurance

DEDUCTION of $29 per month.
THE COURT:

HOW IS the kronos calculated?

1

MR. EDLUND:

2

THE COURT;

Kronos.

3

MR. L I I L Y :

Taxable income, Ma'am 7

4

T H E COURT:

They did not include it in the

5

number that you gave me.

6
7

is THERE Any objection to his job-related
expenses of 160 7

8
9

I'm sorry, your honor?

MS. L I L L Y :
that's

I T ' S probaBly A b i t

lower,

but

fine.

10

T H E COURT:

Sir, does your spouse work?

11

M R . LILLY:

Yes, ma'am.

12

THE COURT:

what does she earn?

13

MR. LILLY:

I'm not sure of the exact figure.

14

MS. LILLY:

she is present your honor.

15

THE COURT:

what did you come up with for

16

mother's incorne7

17
18
19

MR. EDLUND:

I calculated it to be $2,395 per

THE COURT:

Okay.

month,
I don't really know what to

20

DO about her income because of the structure of her pay.

21

it's difficult to figure out exactly what it's going to

22

be at any given time.

23

MS. LILLY:

Your honor.

24

THE COURT:

Yes.

25

MS. LILLY:

I get a raise once a year,

and when

26

I started on as A pharmacy tech there was AN opportunity

27

to take a test to make A L I T T L E B I T more M O N E Y .

28

start you out at O N L Y 11.54.

They

I took a test and I passed

9
1

it.

There is only one more test available to take and

2

pass, BUT I HAVE to wait six months before I can even

3

take it.

4

year.

5
6

Other than that they give ONE regular raise a

MR. LILLY;

I'll concur with the figure that you

JUST said, the $2,300.

7

MS. LILLY:

8

MR. EDLUND:

9

THE COURT:

Now, the time share; what's the time

MR. LILLY:

By the divorce decree, your honor,

10

okay.
$2,395.

share 7

11
12

it's 25/75 and THE visitation schedule HAS not changed, i

13

still get her every two weeks, every three months.

14

is no pending request by her to have that modified in any

15

way.

16

divorce decree of 25/75 as it is.

There

So, I'd like to stay as per the order in the

17

MS. LILLY:

I've gone through the calendars, I

18

write when he took her and brings her home.

19

years it's only been -- had her eighty-eight days.

20

does not take her two weeks, every three months.

21

of times he takes her ten -- every six months.

22

why I said the TEN percent because I've gone through the

23

records.

24
25
26

THE COURT:

Of the three
He
A lot
That's

Is it your testimony that you

exercise every visitation 7
MR. LILLY:

Every visitation with the exception

27

if I get her on- or off-holiday.

I'd have to go all the

28

way up to Utah to have her for one day.

I had to forego

10
1

my holiday visitations.

2

three months.

3

three-month period almost to the day.

4

paper that we agreed to, TWO W E E K period of time, and i

5

have E-mails that she's requested to cut into those days.

6

to say, can you bring her back a day early and then the

7

FiRst day I was supposed to bring her back 7:00 in the

8

morning

9

MS

10

But my full-on two weeks every

I've just had her two weeks after my

LILLY:

MR. LILLY:

I have a signed

objection.
I have a -- you know, I didn't get

11

her until

12

would have to drive from San Diego to salt lake city.

13

was supposed to pick her up at 7:00 a.m.

14

visitation is almost to the "T".

15

i had delayed it a little bit because we got married to

16

guarantee that my daughter COULD be in the wedding.

17

didn't want to cut her out of the wedding.

18

earlier, previous to three months.

19
20

3:30 in the afternoon that day.

T H E COURT:

knowing that I
I

I exercize my

There is one time that

I

It was

But your testimony is two weeks

every three months; that's what you have?

21

MR. LILLY:

Yes, ma'am.

22

THE COURT:

And yours is he does not exercise

24

MS. LILLY:

Here's a record of his visitation.

25

T H E COURT:

For the future, if you want me to

23

it 7

26

consider anything like that then you need to get it in

27

ahead of time.

28

I'm going to use A 15 percent time share,

You're remarried, sir?

11
1

MR. LILLY:

Yes, ma'am.

2

THE COURT:

Do you have any other children?

3

MR. LILLY:

NO.

4

T H E COURT

Ma'am, are you remarried 7

5

MS. LILLY.

NO.

6

T H E COURT:

You have no other children in your

8

MS. LILLY

NO

9

THE COURT

what I'll do is make the following

10

findings and order

11

time share

12

Mother is head of household and two

13

taxable wages are $3,763.

14

$3,072.

15

not on his income and expense declaration and he does not

16

know what it is.

17

Guideline -- I'm going to give him a $160 other guideline

18

deduction for job-related expenses.

19

$6,018.

20

gross taxable wages of $2,395.

7

home 7

there is one minor child.

15 percent

Father is married filing jointly with two.
Father's gross

He has nontaxable income of

I'm not utilizing any new spouse income, it's

Health insurance premium is $29

Father's net is

Mother is head of household and two.

She has

21

Does she have any deductions 7

22

MR. EDLUND:

23

T H E COURT:

Any health insurance 7

24

MS. LILLY:

I do have health insurance.

25
26
27
28

There is none noted, your honor.

It's

not very much, like $72.
MR. EDLUND:

I did report that your honor, she

has a $72 a month health insurance deduction.
THE COURT:

Pretax.

$72 pretax health insurance

12
1

for mother.

2

MR

LILLY:

Your honor, there is one thing that

3

wasn't noted is my travel expenses.

4

Utah to pick her up and then back here and then to return

5

her.

6

the S250

7
8

I have to travel to

upstairs we claimed that and it would be agreed on

MS. LILLY:

in the court's decree it says that

he's responsible for full travel expenses.

9

MR. LILLY:

Tnose are my expanses, $250.

10

THF COURT:

Do you know wherq that is in the

11

judgment, Ma'am?

12

MS. LILLY:

The divorce decree?

13

THE COURT:

Yes.

14

MR. L U L Y :

it's on Page four, paragraph five.

15

Subparagraph A.

Last sentence

16

THE

17

MR. LILLY:

18

T H E COURT:

COURT:

Page four of the judgment?
Yes, your honor.
\-iere we go.

19

your travel-associated expenses.

20

agreement between the two of you?

21

MR. LILLY:

Says that you bEar
Seems to be an

Yes, your honor.

It said in the

22

calculation -- it sthe, what are your travel expenses?

23

although we agreed that I pay for THEM, you do not recoup

24

100 percent of your expenses.

25

THE COURT:

26
27
28

I'm sorry, but I don't understand

your argument.
MR. LILLY:
expenses, a l t h o u g h i t

My argument i s t h a t t h e
is

right that

travel

I do bEar t h e

travel

13
1

expenses, I mean, maybe I'm misunderstanch ng the form, I

2

take it -- I perceive it's asking wiat my travel expenses

3

are to go and pick up my daughter.

4

in the calculation.

5

MR

FDlUND

I could claim those

what happens, your honor, they put

6

the travel expense in the guideline calculator upstairs,

7

it splits that cost between the parties and gives him

8

$125 deduction.

9

have done that.

10

it does not appear to be appropriate to

THE COURT.

That issue is not before me today.

11

no one filed it, no one briefed it, no one discussed it,

12

filed a declaration on it.

13

that you're to bear all the costs.

14

GUIDELINE and split it, which is not how I read the

15

agreement.

16

seek legal counsel on to see if you can file something

17

That is not before me today.

18

before me today.

19

Right now the judgment says
to put it in the

But, it may be something that you wish to

MR. LILLY:

It was not properly put

As explained upstairs, it does not

20

split it, she could put any travel that she takes.

21

That's how it was explained upstairs.

22

spl it.

23

THE COURT:

it's not actaully

I don't know who did that.

24

Hopefully mr. edlund will speak to them about that,

the

25

judgment provides that you pay -- the way that I'm

26

reading it right now that you bear all the costs for

27

travel.

28

it does is IT splits IT between the two of YOU, allocates

So, if i put it in the add-on information, what

14
1

it half and half.

2

initial reading of your judgment that's not what I think

3

that you intended.

4

MR.

which is not -- at least in the

EDLUND;

But -unless there is a stipulation by

5

the parties to stipulate to modify that, that's not

6

properly before the court.

7

T H E COURT:

well, it's not property before me

8

and it does split it

9

splits it and I don't think I can do that given the

10

current state of your agreement.

11

Like I said, I'm not ruling On that, I have not

12

made an order.

13

be changed.

14

today.

15

support is $1,225.

16

filed?

17
18

By putting it in the machine it

I'm not making it an order.

That can't

I'm saying it's not an order before me

Right now I'm going to use those factors.

MR. E D L U N D :

Child

That will -- when( was the motion

it was filed on July 30th, request

to be effective August 1st.

19

THE COURT:

That will be effective August 1st.

20

any arrears paid at $100 a month, commencing

21

November 1st, 2009.

22

uncovered healthcare pursuant to family code section

23

4063.

24

and standard health insurance order.

25
26

Each party to pay one-half of

One-half of healthcare associated with employment

Are you covering your child on your health
insurance?

27

MR. LILLY:

Yes, ma'am.

28

T H E COURT:

if that somehow is not available to

15
1

you any longer you need to come in before it terminates

2

so I can make provisions for the health insurance for the

3

child.

4

Anybody have any questions 7

5

MS. LILLY:

NO.

6

MR. LILLY:

NO.

7

T H E COURT:

Like I said, sir, I haven't ruled on

8

the travel expenses at this point in time because it was

9

not put in as an issue.

if you want to b r ing that as an

10

issue, my suggestion would be that you see an attorney

11

and see about that.

12
13

Have a seat, I'll prepare the findings and
recommendations for you.

14
15
16

MR. EDLUND:

I believe that concludes the

calendar.
T H E COURT:

It does.

17

(proceedings Concluded)

18

--000--

19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

Reporter's Certificate

STATb OF CALIFORNIA)
) SS:
COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO)

I, L A U R A L O N G A R I N I , Certified Shorthand Reporter,
NO

12384, An Official court Reporter of the Superior Court

of the County of San Diego, State of California, do hereby
certify
That I reported in machine shorthand the proceedings
held in the foregoing case;
That my notes were transcribed into typewriting under
my direction; and the foregoing pages, 1 to 15, contain a
correct transcription of the proceedi rjgs.

Dated this 1 0 T H day of JUNE 2009^

N

/"%

LAURA LONGARINT, CSR NO. 123$4
Official Court Reporter
San Diego Superior Court
(Government Code 69954(d); Any court, party, or person
who has purchased a transcript may, without paying a
further fee to the reporter, reproduce a copy or portion
thereof as an exhibit pursuant to couirt order or rule, or
for internal use, but shall not otherwise provide or sell
a copy or copies to any other party or person.)

Westlaw
28 U S C A *> 1738B

Page 1

c
Effective: August 5, 1997
United States Code Annotated C uirentness
Title 28 Judiciary and ludicial Piocedure (Kefs & \nnos)
*$ Pait V Procedure
*(| Chaptci 115 Fvidence, Documentary (Rtfs & Aminos)
-+ § 1738B. Full faith and credit for child support orders

(a) General rule.—The appropriate authorities of each State—

(1) shall enfoicc according to its terms a child support ordei made consistenth with this section by a court of
another State, and

(2) shall not seek oi make a modification of such an older except in accoi dance with subsections (e), (f), and

(0
(b) Definitions.—In this section
"child1' means—

(A) a person under 18 years of age, and

(B) a person 18 oi moie years of age with respect to whom a child suppoit oidei has been issued pursuant to
the laws of a State
"child's State" means the State in which a child resides
"child's home State'1 means the State in which a child lived with a parent or a peison acting as parent for at
least 6 consecutive months immediately pieccding the time oi filing of a pet'tion oi compaiabie pleading for
support and, if a child is less than 6 months old, the State in which the child lived horn birth with any ot them
A period of temporary absence of any of them is counted as part of the 6-month period

"child support" means a payment of money, continuing support, or arrearages or the provision of a benefit
(including payment of health insurance, child care, and educational expenses) for the support of a child
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"child support order"--

(A) means a judgment dcr^e, 01 ordei of a couit requiring the payment of child support in periodic
amounts or m a lump sum, and

(B) includes—

(i) a permanent or temporarv order, and

(u) an initial oidcr or a modification of an order
1

contestant" means—

(A) a person (including a parent) who—

(i) claims a tight to leceive child support,
(ii) is a party to a proceeding that may result in the issuance of a child support order, or

(iii) is under a child support order, and

(B) a State or political subdivision of a State to which the right to obtain child support has been assigned.
"court" means a court or administrative agency of a State that is authorised by State law to establish the
amount of child support payable by a contestant or make a modification of a child support order.

"modification" means a change in a child support order that affects the amount, scope, or duration of the order
and modifies, replaces, supeisedes, oi otherwise is made subsequent to the child support order.

"State" means a State of the United States, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the
ten itories and possessions of the United Stales, and Indian country (as defined in section 1151 of title IS).
(c) Requirements of child support orders.-A child support older made by a court of a State is made consistently with this section if—

(1) a court that makes the order, pursuant to the laws of the State in which the court is located and subsections
(e), (f), and (g)~

©2010 Thomson Reuters No Claim to Ong US Gov. Works.

28U.S.C.A. § 1738B

Page 3

(A) has subject matter jurisdiction to hear the matter and enter such an order; and

(B) has personal jurisdiction over the contestants; and

(2) reasonable notice and opportunity to be heard is given to the contestants.
(d) Continuing jurisdiction.—A court of a State that has made a child support order consistently with this section has continuing, exclusive jurisdiction over the order if the State is the child's State or the residence of any
individual contestant unless the court of another State, acting in accordance with subsections (e) and (0, has
made a modification of the order.

(e) Authority to modify orders.-A court of a State may modify a child support order issued by a court of another State if—
(I) the court has jurisdiction to make such a child support order pursuant to subsection (i); and

(2)(A) the court of the other State no longer has continuing, exclusive jurisdiction of the child support order
because that State no longer is the child's State or the residence of any individual contestant; or

(B) each individual contestant has filed written consent with the State of continuing, exclusive jurisdiction for
a court of another State to modify the order and assume continuing, exclusive jurisdiction over the order.
(f) Recognition of child support orders.—If 1 or more child support orders have been issued with regard to an
obligor and a child, a court shall apply the following rules in detennining which order to recognize for purposes
of continuing, exclusive jurisdiction and enforcement:

(1) If only 1 court has issued a child support order, the order of that court must be recognized.
(2) If 2 or more courts have issued child support orders for the same obligor and child, and only 1 of the courts
would have continuing, exclusive jurisdiction under this section, the order of that court must be recognized.

(3) If 2 or more courts have issued child support orders for the same obligor and child, and more than 1 of the
courts would have continuing, exclusive jurisdiction under this section, an order issued by a court in the current home State of the child must be recognized, but if an order has not been issued in the current home State
of the child, the order most recently issued must be recognized.

(4) If 2 or more courts have issued child support orders for the same obligor and child, and none of the courts
would have continuing, exclusive jurisdiction under this section, a court having jurisdiction over the parties
shall issue a child support order, which must be recognized.
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(5) The court that has issued an order recognized under this subsection is the court having continuing, exclusive jurisdiction under subsection (d)

(g) Enforcement of modified orders.-A court of a State that no longer has continuing, exclusive jurisdiction of
a child support order may enforce the order with respect to nonmodifiable obligations and unsatisfied obligations that accrued before the date on which a modification of the order is made under subsections (e) and (f).

(h) Choice of law.~(1) In general.-in a proceeding to establish, modify, or enforce a child support order, the forum State's law
shall apply except as provided in paragraphs (2) and (3).

(2) Law of State of issuance of order.-In interpreting a child support order including the duration of current
payments and other obligations of support, a court shall apply the law of the St^te of the court that issued the
order

(3) Period of limitation.—In an action to enforce arrears under a child support order, a court shall apply the
statute of limitation of the forum State or the State oi" the court that issued the order, whichever statute
provides the longer period of umitation.

(i) Registration for modification.-If there is no individual contestant or child residing in the issuing State, the
party or support enforcement agency seeking to modify, or to modify and enforce, a child support order issued in
another State shall register that order in a State with jurisdiction over the nonraov^nt for the purpose of modification.

CREDIT(S)
(Added Pub.L. 103-383, § 3(a), Oct. 22, 1994, 108 Stat. 4064, and amended Pub.L. 104-193, Title III, § 322,
Aug. 22, 1996, 110 Stat. 2221; Pub.L. 105-33, Title V, § 5554, Aug. 5, 1997, 111 Stat. 636.)
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